

Anselm of Canterbury and Anselm of Havelberg: the controversy with the Greeks

St. Anselm and Anselm of Havelberg wrote within half a century of one another on two issues of doctrine where there were important differences between Greek and Latin Christians: the procession of the Holy Spirit and the use of leavened or unleavened bread in the celebration of the Eucharist. During the intervening decades these matters had become topics of some general interest in the schools. Among the scholars of the mid-twelfth century Anselm of Havelberg suggests himself as a valuable candidate for comparison with Anselm of Canterbury. When we set their works side by side it becomes clear that many of their concerns about method and subject-matter are common. Yet Anselm of Havelberg saw the difficulties involved in a light quite different from that in which they presented themselves to St. Anselm. The change of emphasis this reflects has a good deal to tell us about the direction of the developments in theological debate during the first decades of the twelfth century. Anselm of Havelberg writes as a man of his time, and yet in certain respects his achievement is a remarkably original one. Although he was for a time a student at Laon¹), where St. Anselm's work was known²), and although he was an intimate of the Papal court, where, again, copies of Anselm's works were available³), he appears to have worked out his views on the procession of the Holy Spirit quite independently.

The principal difference between the ways in which the two scholars went about their task seems to have lain in the fact that Anselm of Canterbury had almost certainly not held formal discussions with

¹) Anselm of Havelberg *Dialogus* ed. G. Salet (Paris 1966) p. 8. A bibliography for Anselm is given *ibid.*, p. 23-4.

²) O. LOTTIN, *Psychologie et morale aux xii^e et xiii^e siècles* V (Gembloux 1959) p. 253, no. 322, for example, and see R.W. Southern *St. Anselm and his Biographer* (Cambridge 1963) p. 357-62.

³) The *De Incarnatione Verbi* and the *Cur Deus Homo* were both sent to Urban II when they were finished. See *Anselmi Opera Omnia* ed. F.S. Schmitt (Rome/Edinburgh 1938-68) 6 vols., (= S), S 2.3.3 and S 2.39-41.

advocates of the Greek viewpoint, while Anselm of Havelberg did so most conscientiously and at some length. It has always been something of a mystery that Anselm was invited by the Pope to refute the views of the Greeks at the Council of Bari. Whether he encountered actual holders of the Greek doctrine there or whether he spoke on the basis of what he had read of their opinions is not clear from the *De Processione Spiritus Sancti*, which he wrote some years later at the request of those who had heard him speak. The treatise does not take the form of a dialogue and the interpolations Anselm anticipates from those who disagree with him take the rather vague form: *si quis tamen vult dicere*⁴), «But if anyone wishes to say», or: *Quod si dicunt*⁵), «If they say». Eadmer says in his *Life* of St. Anselm that he was 'persuaded by the Pope' to confute the Greeks in a rational and catholic disputation: *rationabili atque catholica disputatione*⁶), but the word *disputatio* did not at this time carry so clearly-defined a technical sense as it was to do later, and it appears more likely that Anselm gave an address, than that he conducted a public debate as Anselm of Havelberg later did. The possibility that Anselm of Canterbury discussed the matter with holders of the opposing view cannot be dismissed; he begins his treatise with a clear statement of the two principles of which he intends to base what he has to say: the Greeks deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, and they do not accept the Latin authorities (*doctores nostros Latinos*) whom Latin Christians follow in adopting their own standpoint. But the objections he anticipates do not, on the whole, have the flavour of matters raised in live argument, even though Eadmer says in the *Historia Novorum* that the Pope called upon him to address 'those Greeks whom you see trying to take away the Church's honour': *suam integritatem vides Graecos istos conari adimere*, and there may well have been holders of the Greek opinion present: *mota est quaedam quaestio ex parte Graecorum*, «a question was put on behalf of the Greeks», «who made many objections»⁷).

⁴) S 2.204.13.

⁵) S 2.205.18.

⁶) The speech at the Council of Bari is described by Eadmer, *Eadmer's Life of St. Anselm* ed. R.W. Southern (London 1962) p. 112-3, *Historia Novorum* ed. M. Rule, *Rolls Series* 81 (1884) p. 104-110, and in the *Anonymi Barensis Chronicon, Rerum Italicarum Scriptores* V ed. L.A. Muratori (new edition ed. G. Carducci and V. Fiorini 1900).

⁷) *Historia Novorum*, p. 104-5.

By contrast, there can be no doubt at all of Anselm of Havelberg's opportunity to talk to holders of the Greek view. In 1135 he was sent as an ambassador to Constantinople⁸). In his *Dialogus* not only his opponent Nechites, Archbishop of Nicomedia, is named, but also the three learned Latins who understood both Greek and Latin and who were present as witnesses to what was said: James of Venice, Burgundius of Pisa and Moses of Pergamum⁹). Anselm even gives the dates of the conversations¹⁰). He has done everything he can to give verisimilitude to his account and to show that here is no schoolroom dialogue, no discussion with a hypothetical opponent¹¹), but the fruit of actual debate.

There is a second area of contrast in the spirit in which the two Anselms have approached their task. For Anselm of Canterbury it was, almost certainly, not a very welcome task. He carried it out from a sense of duty. At the time when he was invited to speak at the Council of Bari he was still working on the subject-matter of the *Cur Deus Homo*, and he seems to have finished the appendix to that work, the *De Conceptu Virginali*, before he completed the treatise *De Processione Spiritus Sancti* which represents the polished version of his speech at Bari. He was, in other words, busy with other work. The treatise opens with the hope that his Greek opponents will be willing to be convinced, and not determined at all costs to win what can only be an empty victory: *pro inani victoria contendere*¹²). Throughout the work Anselm considers conscientiously all the possible objections the Greeks may raise, but there are only occasional indications that he himself derived pleasure from the task, where a novel method of demonstration has occurred to him. This was not, in other words, a subject Anselm had chosen for himself; nor was it one on which he would ever have needed to write had he not been made aware that a large body of Christians were in error, and that it was his duty to try to put them right¹³).

For Anselm of Havelberg the issue was of burning interest. Perhaps it had been brought alive for him by his encounters with eastern Christians.

⁸) *Dialogus*, p. 8.

⁹) PL 188.1163.

¹⁰) PL 188.1163, cf. *Dialogus*, p. 8.

¹¹) A number of the contemporary dialogues between Christians and Jews or Christians and *gentiles* name no actual protagonist.

¹²) S 2.177.8.

¹³) S 2.212.3-4.

Certainly he seems to have felt that although he was not qualified to write about it by a personal knowledge of the Greek language and the Greek Fathers, he was uniquely well-equipped to convey to the Latin world what the Greeks believed because he had made a special study of their views, because he had consulted experts in both languages, and because he had himself had some success (according to the *Dialogus* account) in bringing about conversions. He was inspired by his achievement to write a preliminary book — which forms Book I of the *Dialogus* — in which he discusses the grand historical and theological issues raised by the existence of differences of opinion within the Church. St. Anselm's view had always been that where differences existed reflection would show either that they were illusory, and that there was no difference in reality at all, or else that the errors of those who held an opinion out of keeping with the orthodox view would be made plain to them by reasoning; once that was done, Anselm believed, they would accept the orthodox view¹⁴). This was an attitude which it became increasingly difficult for him to maintain in later years, as he was brought more forcibly into contact with men who did not agree with him, but it remained substantially his position to the end¹⁵).

For Anselm of Havelberg the existence of the Greek believers constituted an intellectual challenge; it also provided a stimulus to thought about what were in his day topical issues of historical theology:

Solent plerique mirari, et in quaestionem ponere, et interrogando non solum sibi, verum etiam aliis scandalum generare ... Quare tot novitates in Ecclesia Dei fiunt¹⁶)?

«Many men are in the habit of wondering, and posing the question (and they cause not only themselves but others to meet a stumbling-block when they ask) ... why so many novelties occur in the Church of God?» In attempting the answer this question he discourses on the working out of God's purposes in history. There is nothing like this to be found anywhere in St. Anselm's writings. That is not surprising.

¹⁴) See his discussions of the differences in usage between Greeks and Latins in talking about the substance and Persons of the Trinity: S 1.8.14-18, S 2.35-5-9, S 4.96.23-97.47, *Letter* 204. The *Cur Deus Homo* was written to bring the *infideles* to orthodox faith by means of reasonable argument, S. 2.48.6-9.

¹⁵) From the time, just before he was made Archbishop of Canterbury, when Anselm drafted the *De Incarnatione Verbi* in response to Roscelin's accusations, he found himself more and more often obliged to encounter opponents as well as friends in the world of theological debate and ecclesiastical politics.

¹⁶) *Dialogus*, p. 34.

Anselm of Havelberg is responding to a convention of his own day in trying to interpret sacred history in this way, and to link it with contemporary events¹⁷). A preoccupation with what is 'new' is apparent already in the title of Eadmer's *Historia Novorum*, his 'history of recent events', but Eadmer does not try to construct a philosophy of history round his narrative. Yet Anselm of Havelberg has been prompted by his talks with the Greeks to think hard about the place of the phenomenon of doctrinal disagreement in the divine clan; he has written an original work of historical theology in the first book of the *Dialogus*, as well as a discussion of the actual doctrinal differences he has attempted to resolve.

The subject-matter of the debate with the Greeks was itself of greater interest in the middle years of the twelfth century than it had been in Anselm of Canterbury's day — at least as a topic for debate in the schools. J. de Ghellinck suggests that as a result of the debates over the *filioque* clause a certain unease had crept into the schools about the use of Greek authorities and the interpretation and borrowing of Greek terms¹⁸). What was said by the Greeks was at best less authoritative: *minus authenticum*¹⁹), and at worst erroneous. In the absence of a common knowledge of Greek, it was difficult for any systematic study of the Greek Fathers to throw light on the strengths and weaknesses of their work. Robert of Melun professes himself ignorant of the Greek language²⁰), and there were comparatively few men who could stand beside Anselm of Havelberg's Greek-speaking Latin scholars. A language-barrier existed, despite the active interest early and mid-twelfth century scholars show in Greek terms. Thierry of Chartres and the commentators of his 'school' raise a number of points of technical terminology, where the Greek word is compared with the Latin²¹). In the climate of developing interest in language and in technical terms in which contemporary scholars worked, the slightest acquaintance with Greek usages was of fresh interest and value.

Behind these discussions, however, lay the shadow of the *filioque* controversy (and, to a lesser extent, the disagreement about the use of

¹⁷) B. Smalley «Ecclesiastical attitudes to novelty c.1100-c.1250» *Studies in Church History* 12 (1975) 113-33 has discussed some of the contemporary views of novelty.

¹⁸) J. DE GHELLINCK, *Le mouvement théologique du xii^e siècle* (Bruges 1948), p. 402.

¹⁹) EBERHARD of BAMBERG, *Letter* xvi, in a passage on the Greeks, PL 193.555.

²⁰) ROBERT of MELUN, *Sententiae* ed. R. MARTIN, *Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense* (1947) p. 38.

leavened and unleavened bread). Thierry of Chartres remarks that the Greeks say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father but not the Son: *quod falsum est*²²), «but this is false»: *et alie plures auctoritates id consonant*²³), «and many other authorities agree». Not every occasion on which the procession of the Holy Spirit is discussed provokes such a comment, but it is difficult for any contemporary to leave the Greek view out of account. Hugh of St. Victor mentions it, as does Abelard²⁴). St. Anselm's treatise had not been effective in convincing the Greeks and bringing about a lasting change in their attitude. Anselm of Havelberg seriously hopes that he has achieved what Anselm has not²⁵), and in any case he has brought back, in some triumph, a report of success from the battle front.

Anselm of Havelberg has chosen the dialogue-form for his *Dialogus* for the simple reason that he has an actual debate to recount. When St. Anselm employs the dialogue in his earlier works, he makes the protagonists master and pupil; the exercise is one of teaching rather than argument. In the *Cur Deus Homo* the participants are Anselm himself and his friend and pupil Boso. Although Boso proposes to speak for the *infideles* he does not in fact do so consistently throughout, and the discussion falls into a different pattern, where two friends explore the solution of various difficulties together. In Anselm of Havelberg's dialogue the two combatants speak in turn — although Anselm himself has taken the largest share of the space available — and far from exploring the issue together they retain their clearly-defined and distinct viewpoints throughout, until the Greek concedes victory at each stage of the argument. Anselm of Havelberg is writing in the contemporary tradition of the dialogues between Christians and the holders of other faiths, after the fashion of Gilbert Crispin or Peter Abelard²⁶). His *Dialogus* (although it might be said to resemble

²¹) *Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and his School*, ed. N.M. HÄRING (Toronto 1971), p. 238, 240, 242, 247, 248 et al.

²²) *Ibid.*, p. 494.26-30.

²³) *Ibid.*, p. 494.32-3.

²⁴) PL 176.52, *Summa Sententiarum* I, 6., ABELARD, *Theologia Summi Boni*, ed. H. OSTLENDER, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters* 35 (1939), p. 103, *Theologia Christiana*, ed. M. BUYTAERT, *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievals* XII (Turnhout 1969) IV.20, p. 325, *Ysagoge* III, *Écrits théologiques de l'école d'Abelard*, ed. A. LANDGRAF, *Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense* 14 (1934) 254.

²⁵) PL 188.1209-10.

²⁶) *Gisleberti Crispini Disputatio Iudei et Christiani*, ed. B. Blumenkranz (Antwerp

Lanfranc's earlier dialogue with Berengar in the *Corpore et Sanguine Domini*²⁷), is a product of early twelfth century habits of scholarship. St. Anselm's dialogues have a far more Augustinian flavour. Neither in the *De Processione Spiritus Sancti* nor in the *De Incarnatione Verbi*, where he was arguing against specific opponents, did Anselm of Canterbury find the dialogue the most comfortable vehicle for his exposition. Up to a point, this is a reflection of his personal preference; but it indicates, too, that a change in attitude had taken place by Anselm of Havelberg's day, which made it natural for him to try to give immediacy and topicality to his dialogue by describing the debate he had with the Greeks as graphically as possible.

In certain respects, the approach of the two writers to the solving of the problem of the difference of opinion with the Greeks, is superficially similar. Anselm of Havelberg, like St. Anselm, begins by giving a summary of received doctrine. He points out that Greek and Latin Christians accept that God is three in one, that there are three Persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and that they share the whole of Trinitarian doctrine except the view that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son²⁸). St. Anselm says very much the same²⁹). This seems to have been the usual method of posing the problem, although sometimes it is done more briefly, as it is, for example, by Abelard and Thierry of Chartres. Abelard simply states the main point of difference, that on the basis of *Spiritus qui a patre procedit* in John 15.26, the Greeks believe that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone³⁰). But while Anselm of Havelberg and Abelard alike use this as a point of departure for discussions which grow broader, and which range over the whole field of implications of this view, for St. Anselm it is a means of defining the issue in question as narrowly as possible. He says that he is unwilling to go beyond what he has been asked to do: *quod postulant aggrediar*³¹). «I shall attempt to do what they ask». From the beginning of his treatise he makes it plain that it is not congenial to him to be forced to extend the scope of his treatment of a matter which there would be no need to write

1956), *Petrus Abaelardus Dialogus inter Philosophum Judaeum et Christianum* ed. R. Thomas (Stuttgart 1966).

²⁷) Printed in PL 150.

²⁸) PL 188.1164.

²⁹) S 177.18-178.12.

³⁰) ABELARD, *Theologia Christiana*, p. 325; Thierry p. 494.26-33.

³¹) S 1.177.15.

about at all, if none held the heretical view. Anselm always preferred to prove what orthodox doctrine asserted, to demonstrate by reason what he and his fellow Latin Christians already held by faith, rather than to argue a case against an alternative viewpoint. There is nothing in St. Anselm's treatise of the sheer pleasure in controversy, the curiosity about other men's opinions, which is so marked a feature of the *Dialogue* of Anselm of Havelberg.

Both Anselm of Havelberg and Abelard give a list of the teachings of earlier thinkers. Abelard lists sayings of the Fathers from Athanasius and Didymus, to Chrysostom, Augustine and Jerome³²). Anselm of Havelberg considers the different kinds of heretics whose teachings the black horse of the *Apocalypse* represents: *Niger equus atra haereticorum doctrina est*³³). He lists Arians, Sabellians, Nestorians, followers of Eutyches, Macedonius, Donatus, Plotinus, Manes, and points out that there are many more³⁴). St. Anselm could not have produced so impressive a list either of patristic writers or of heretics, because his reading had been so much narrower than that of either Abelard or Anselm of Havelberg. He certainly knew of the Arians and the Sabellians³⁵); but it is doubtful whether he would have felt such listing of authorities or of heretical viewpoints helpful. This again distinguishes him, both personally and as a scholar of his day, from Anselm of Havelberg and Abelard, to whom such exercises appeared valuable and interesting.

A further aspect of the problem presented itself to Anselm of Havelberg and Peter Abelard. The Greeks had arrived at their view by arguing a case in their own language, while the Latin Christians had worked out their position in Latin. The extent to which discussions of Trinitarian doctrine were dependent upon technical precision in the use of language was clear to St. Anselm³⁶), but he, unlike his twelfth century successors, was unable to take account of the exact differences Greek usage made. Abelard points out that the difference of doctrine goes deeper than the mere surface appearance of the words: *hoc est contrario modo, non diverso verborum sono, quia et nos Latine dicimus quod illi Graece*³⁷), «That is, on the contrary, not merely in a difference

³²) *Theologia Christiana*, p. 328.

³³) *Dialogus*, p. 76.

³⁴) *Ibid.*, p. 78.

³⁵) S 2.15-16.

³⁶) S 2.178.4-5.

³⁷) *Theologia Christiana*, p. 326, 1951.

in the sound of the word, for we say in Latin what they say in Greek». In his debate, Anselm of Havelberg had to make practical provision for circumventing the difficulty posed by the language barrier. We have seen how he assembled bilingual witnesses. He explains that at the very beginning of the discussion it was decided that he and his Greek opponent would argue not about words and usages, but about meanings: *non videbimur verborum observatores, sed sententiarum investigatores*³⁸).

He and Nechites do not succeed entirely in their objective, but the technical discussions drawn from the *artes* which Anselm introduces merely add an additional dimension of discussion about language to what is being said about differences of meaning; the argument never turns entirely upon a point of linguistic analysis. Anselm, for instance, criticises Nechites' argument (that to claim that the Holy Spirit proceeds from Father and Son is to imply that there are two *principia* in the Trinity) like this:

Hanc tuam argumentationem cum tam festinato enthymemate nequaquam suscipiendam judico. Ex hoc enim vero quod premissum est, non sequitur illud falsum quod illatum est: verum est autem quod spiritus sanctus procedit a patre et a filio, sed falsum est quod duo sunt principia; ideoque nulla est ibi cohaerentia³⁹).

«I do not think that your argument with its hurried enthymeme is to be accepted. For the false conclusion which is drawn does not follow from the true premiss. It is true that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, but it is false that there are two sources; therefore there is no connection between them». Anselm's view is that since Father and Son are one God they cannot be said to be more than *unum principium*. He has employed his technical skills of dialectic to detect the fallacy in Nechites' argument, and although they are discussing meanings, it must be conceded that they are acting as *verborum observatores*, too, despite their first intention.

More items drawn from the study of the *artes* are to be found throughout the dialogue. Anselm refers to the *transpositio* of the names of the Persons in some Scriptural texts⁴⁰). He argues that this in itself implies that the three Persons are one God because they are in a sense 'interchangeable' in position, just as the Holy Spirit is third

³⁸) PL 188.1164.

³⁹) PL 188.1166.

⁴⁰) PL 188.1175-6.

in the Trinity not in dignity, but only in order: *numerandi ordine*⁴¹). We meet the idea that the names *Pater*, *Filius* and *Spiritus Sanctus* may be regarded as *nomina defectiva*, if we say that, in that the Father is not the Son nor the Holy Spirit, the name 'Father' is deficient: *in hoc sit deficiens*⁴²). The Holy Spirit is said to proceed *secundum relationem*, according to his relation, not according to his substance (which is common to all the Persons of the Trinity) nor according to his Person (which is his own: *quae ad se dicitur*)⁴³). None of these devices or topics for discussion is peculiar to Anselm of Havelberg. These were common areas of interest of the day in which the technical principles of the *artes* were applied to the resolution of theological problems. There are traces of similar preoccupations in St. Anselm's treatise. Anselm of Havelberg has not found in practice that it is possible to set aside contemporary questions of usage and issues of linguistic philosophy and concentrate on the investigation of differences in meaning only. He is consistent only in his refusal to be drawn into argument over individual Greek words. He knows the word *προσωλεῦς* to be equivalent to the Latin *emissor*. But «because the exact significance of this Greek name is uncertain, I do not wish to base any certain conclusion on its definition for the moment».

Quia vero huius Graeci nominis propria significatio incerta est, nihil certum super interim diffinire volo⁴⁴).

The principal difference between him and St. Anselm in this respect is that Anselm of Canterbury saw in the first place no immediate difficulty in the fact that the Greeks had arrived at their conclusions in Greek, and in the second place, he was not so much hedged about as Anselm of Havelberg was by technical considerations. He discusses substance and relation, unity and plurality, modes of proceeding⁴⁵), because they seem to him, as they did to Anselm of Havelberg, the obvious issues to be resolved, but he applies his mind to them with a freshness which it would have been much more difficult for the Bishop of Havelberg to achieve. By his time the study of the *artes* governed and directed contemporary thought in this area, but it also restricted it. Although Anselm of Havelberg has enjoyed the stimulus of talking to Nechites

⁴¹) PL 188.1172.

⁴²) PL 188.1177.

⁴³) PL 188.1178.

⁴⁴) PL 188.1180.

⁴⁵) S 2.205.18-9 (*duo principia*), S 2.190,1 (*relativa*), S 2.199-200 (modes of proceeding).

in person, he has directed the debate into the conventional channels of Latin scholarship.

St. Anselm employs a striking argument from symmetry in the closing stages of his *De Processione Spiritus Sancti*. He suggests in Chapter 16 that there are six *differentiae*: to have a father, not to have a father, to have a son, not to have a son, to have a spirit proceeding from oneself and not to have a spirit proceeding from oneself. Each of these is peculiar to one of the Persons of the Trinity, or shared by one Person with one of the others, and the distribution gives each one peculiar and two shared qualities⁴⁶). Symmetry is preserved. Anselm of Havelberg has a less developed but not dissimilar argument from symmetry: The Father begets, but not himself; the Son is begotten, but not by himself; the Holy Spirit proceeds, but not from himself⁴⁷).

This can, however, scarcely be taken as an indication that Anselm of Havelberg was in general sympathy with St. Anselm's procedures. On the contrary, he expresses a strong distaste for the method of argument by analogy which Anselm defends in the *De Processione Spiritus Sancti*⁴⁸). Anselm of Havelberg argues that the analogy must be an *inepta similitudo*, used by those who stretch beyond their reach in theology, and yet remain far below their goal: *se supra se in theologiam extendentes, et tamen multum infra theologiam remanentes*⁴⁹). The particular image he has in mind is used by Anselm in the *De Processione* and in the *De Incarnatione Verbi*, and it seems to have made a sufficiently strong impression on the next generation of theologians for it to be the object of a rare reference to Anselm's work by Peter Abelard in his *Theologia Christiana*⁵⁰). The image is not an original invention of Anselm's. It was borrowed by him from Augustine, but his development of it seems to have helped to give it a new currency in twelfth century schools⁵¹). The image involves a comparison of a watercourse made up of spring, river and pool, with the Trinity. Anselm of Canterbury had used it originally for a single purpose: to illustrate how the divine

⁴⁶) On the argument from symmetry, see my article «The use of technical terms of mathematics in the writings of St. Anselm», *Studia Monastica* 18 (1976) 75.

⁴⁷) PL 188.1171.

⁴⁸) S 2.203.7-205.16.

⁴⁹) PL 188.1207.

⁵⁰) *Theologia Christiana*, p. 304, p. 333-5.

⁵¹) See my article «St. Anselm's Images of Trinity' *Journal of Theological Studies*, xxvii (1976) 46-57.

substance was one (the water in the watercourse) in all three Persons, and how the Holy Spirit proceeds from both Father and Son⁵²). He had not intended the analogy to be over-extended, because it is clear that if it is pressed too far it seems to imply that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son. It seems unlikely that Anselm of Havelberg is drawing directly on St. Anselm in giving his account of the image. He does not refer to the river as the Nile, and he introduces additional elements, such as the notion that the pool or *stagnum* can be seen as the *stagnum huius saeculi*, the pool of this world⁵³). It is much more probable that the image was already known to the Greeks, as Anselm of Canterbury implies that it was⁵⁴), and that the Bishop of Havelberg is trying to detach himself and his cause from a body of contemporary discussion which he feels to be unproductive, and even detrimental to the case the Latin Christians have to put forward. It is evident that Anselm of Havelberg is, again, writing in a climate of opinion more developed and more complex than that with which St. Anselm had had to contend a generation earlier, and in which the topics for discussion have been much explored already. He has had to take into account detailed difficulties and objections which St. Anselm was free to omit.

The same contrast is apparent in the way in which the two authors handle the question of the use of leavened or unleavened bread in the Eucharist. Both cite Scriptural texts in support of the case for the Latin practice⁵⁵). But St. Anselm has taken up the defence of his Church only because he has been specifically asked to do so⁵⁶), and his general view is that the matter is not of great importance, although the Roman practice is preferable to the Greek⁵⁷). Anselm of Havelberg is more combative. He accuses the Greeks of going against universal custom: *universalis consuetudo*⁵⁸), and he points out that nowhere in Scripture is leavened bread said to be a good thing; Christ consecrated unleavened bread at the Last Supper, and unleavened bread was always offered as a sacrifice in the Old Testament⁵⁹). Anselm of Canterbury

⁵²) S 2.31-2.

⁵³) PL 188.1207.

⁵⁴) S 2.203.24.

⁵⁵) S 2.224-31.

⁵⁶) S 2.223.4-10.

⁵⁷) S 2.224.7-12.

⁵⁸) PL 188.1211.

⁵⁹) PL 188.1234, 1238.

would not have been able to see the matter as something of so little importance a few decades later, because he would have had to take account of the more highly developed views and the more decided standpoints of contemporary scholars.

Towards the end of Book III of his *Dialogus* Anselm of Havelberg remarks that he thinks he has proved his case both by clear reason and by firm authority: *quam evidenti ratione, quamve firma auctoritate*⁶⁰). At the beginning he had proposed a scheme of reasoning based on Nechites' assertion that three things are relevant to their discussions: reason (*ratio*), *canonicarum scripturarum auctoritas*, the authority of canonical Scripture, and the pronouncements of *generalia concilia*⁶¹), general councils. Abelard, too, seems to have felt that the pronouncements of councils were important. He discusses the councils at which the statements of the Creeds were worked out⁶²). St. Anselm makes use scarcely at all of Scriptural authorities, and never of the pronouncements of councils, but chiefly of reasoning, in the treatises against the Greeks. Here, too, he has a freedom to omit which Anselm of Havelberg neither wanted nor claimed. He takes a scholarly pleasure in citing Greek authorities: Athanasius, Didymus, Origen — even Jerome, who, as he says, knew Greek, Latin and Hebrew — who say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both Father and Son⁶³). He has, as he makes plain, deliberately cultivated an openmindedness which enables him to accept what any authority says without prejudice, so long as it is in conformity with Christian doctrine:

Ego nulli Christianorum, Graeco sive Latino, seu cuiuslibet gentis fideli Christiano, donum sancti spiritus intercludo, nullum contemno, nullum abjicio, nec abjiciendum judico; sed omnem hominem recta loquentem, et ea quae contra apostolicam doctrinam non sunt, scribentem, libera mente suscipio et amplector⁶⁴).

«I do not rule out the possibility of the gift of the Holy Spirit to any Christian, Greek or Latin, or the faithful of any race; I do not condemn anyone; I do not cast out anyone or think that anyone should be cast out; but I receive and embrace with an open mind every man who speaks the truth and writes what is no against apostolic

⁶⁰) PL 188.1236.

⁶¹) PL 188.1165.

⁶²) *Theologia Christiana*, p. 325-6.

⁶³) PL 188.1202.

⁶⁴) PL 188.1204.

doctrine». Anselm of Havelberg has made a decision which he evidently regards as a markedly tolerant one, and above all, a decision which has had to be consciously made. St. Anselm never faced such a decision because his acquaintance with authorities other than Scripture itself, Augustine, Gregory and some of the other Latin Fathers was negligible. He left authority out of account and concentrated on reasoning deliberately⁶⁵), but not because the range of authorities available to him was confusing, or because he felt that some authorities ought not to be accepted at all.

The substance of Anselm of Havelberg's argument again has a good deal in common with that of St. Anselm at first sight, but his order of treatment is quite different. Both begin with the statement of common doctrine and of the specific point of disagreement which we have already examined. Anselm of Havelberg and Nechites then agree that they will first consider how the difference may be settled by reasoning⁶⁶), before they begin to look at authority. Nechites accordingly points out that philosophy teaches the impossibility of there being two first principles: *duo principia*. Either one must be insufficient (if we are to postulate that there are indeed two) or one must be superfluous: *vel utrumque insufficiens esset, aut alterum superfluum esset*⁶⁷). An argument of a similar kind is used by Anselm of Canterbury in the *Monologion* to prove that the Highest Good must be one⁶⁸). He was perfectly familiar with this fundamental *datum* of the neoplatonic philosophy of the day. He knew too, of the argument that if we say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from Father and Son we imply that he has two sources. His answer to this is very much the same as Anselm of Havelberg's:

Quod si dicunt non eum posse esse de duabus causis sive de duobus principiis, respondemus quoniam, sicut non credimus spiritum sanctum esse de hoc unde duo sunt pater et filius, sed de hoc in quo unum sunt⁶⁹).

«But if they say that he cannot have two causes or two beginnings, we may reply that we do not believe the Holy Spirit to be of that in respect of which Father and Son are two, but of that in respect of which they are one». Anselm of Havelberg says that Father and Son

⁶⁵) S 1.7.2-12.

⁶⁶) PL 188.1165.

⁶⁷) PL 188.1165.

⁶⁸) S 1.13-22.

⁶⁹) S 2.205.18-20.

are *unum principium* just as they are *unus deus*⁷⁰). The argument and its rebuttal was evidently something of a commonplace of such discussions.

Anselm of Canterbury uses it as a starting-point for some consideration of the special ways in which the notions of 'cause' and 'effect' and 'beginning' may be said to apply to the Godhead; he develops the philosophical implications of the matter for the special case of God⁷¹). For Anselm of Havelberg the development of the point takes a different form, because he is aware of the existence of contemporary discussion, which he feels obliged to take into account: *apud nonnullos aliqua quaestio est*⁷²), «for some this raises a question», he concedes, as he goes on to consider the three ways in which we may say that there is a: *principium in deo*⁷³). The three ways are these: *substantive in seipsum* (substantially, in relation to himself); *relative autem invicem in Trinitate* (relatively, as the Father is the *principium* of the Son); and again *relative*, but this time in the sense that God is the beginning or creator of created things⁷⁴). The idea that God may be regarded as *principium* in that he is creator is in St. Anselm, too⁷⁵), and he builds a good deal of his argument in the *De Processione Spiritus Sancti* on a discussion of substance and relation⁷⁶). There is no topic raised by Anselm of Havelberg in connection with the discussion of *duo principia* which is not to be found in Anselm of Canterbury's work, too, but the order of treatment in the two works is entirely different. It is clear that we are dealing with a common tradition of discussion, and not with direct borrowing on the part of Anselm of Havelberg.

At this point Nechites concedes that the case for the *unum principium* has been argued to his satisfaction. He raises another difficulty. If the Holy Spirit himself is the *unum principium*, how is it that he does not proceed from himself?

*simili ratione probari potest quod idem Spiritus Sanctus procedat a semetipso*⁷⁷),

«By a similar reason it can be proved that the same Holy Spirit proceeds from himself». Here Anselm of Havelberg introduces the

⁷⁰) PL 188.1166.

⁷¹) Chapter X.

⁷²) PL 188.1167.

⁷³) PL 188.1168.

⁷⁴) PM 188.1168.

⁷⁵) S 2.205.22-6.

⁷⁶) S 2.185-90.

⁷⁷) PL 188.1170.

argument from symmetry which bears so tantalizing a resemblance to that of Anselm of Canterbury. He point out that for each of the Persons there is some attribute which he has, but not in virtue of himself: God the Father begets, but not himself; God the Son is begotten, but not by himself, and the Holy Spirit proceeds, but not from himself. Similarly, it is the proper attribute of the Father that he begets the Son: *proprium est generare filium*, the proper attribute of the Son that he is begotten of the Father: *proprium est generari a patre*, and it is the proper attribute of the Holy Spirit that he proceeds from both as from a single source: *proprium est procedere ab utroque tamquam ab uno principio*⁷⁸). In the fifteenth and sixteenth chapters of the *De Processione Spiritus Sancti* Anselm of Canterbury explores a series of explanations of this kind, in an attempt to demonstrate how there may be differences in the 'sameness' of the Godhead; again, we can only conclude that such demonstrations were frequently resorted to in arguments on the procession of the Holy Spirit during and after Anselm's lifetime, since the method comes so naturally to Anselm of Havelberg's mind.

When his Greek opponent declares himself satisfied on this point, he suggests that the discussion is beginning to move away from its main objective. He asks: *quae et qualis*, what kind of thing this procession is⁷⁹). The Bishop of Havelberg refuses to be drawn into such a discussion. He says that to ask such a question is like asking *quae et qualis* of the generation of the Son or the ingeneration of the Father; if we look into that «we shall both go mad as we peer into divine mysteries»: *et ambo insanemus divina mysteria perscrutantes*⁸⁰). Instead, the two disputants consider some of the implications of the view which Anselm wants Nechites to hold. This involves a good deal of discussion of Trinitarian theology, of the special meanings of unity and simplicity, the absurdity of speaking of time and place in God, substance and relation, the technical difficulties of 'naming' God, much of which has close parallels among the topics Anselm of Canterbury covers. Anselm of Havelberg has more material, as we should expect; he introduces patristic authorities which St. Anselm explicitly excludes, because he knows that the Greeks will not accept the word of the Latin

⁷⁸) PL 188.1171.

⁷⁹) PL 188.1171.

⁸⁰) PL 188.1171.

Fathers⁸¹). (In fact, although he considers a number of points raised by Scriptural texts as he goes along, and although he includes a brief explanation of the reasons why the Latins added the *filioque* clause to the creed they share with the Greeks in all other respects⁸²), he does not in general depart from the first of the Bishop of Havelberg's proposed exercises: that of demonstrating the procession of the Holy Spirit from Father and Son by reason alone). It would not be true, then, to say that the *De Processione Spiritus Sancti* has the breadth of treatment or the scope of the *Dialogus*, nor that St. Anselm has anticipated all the difficulties and objections with which Anselm of Havelberg has had to contend. But he has, nevertheless, shown himself to be familiar with most of them. His treatise belongs, in its subject-matter and in the technical considerations it embraces, to the same tradition of formal discussion of the procession of the Holy Spirit as Anselm of Havelberg's work.

The principal difference between the two works lies not so much in the greater accretion of scholarship on which the later writer is able to draw, as in the quality of St. Anselm's thought. Anselm of Havelberg concludes from both Greek and Latin authorities that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father *proprie et principaliter*, properly and firstly⁸³). Anselm of Canterbury has looked at the same point; he shows in Chapter xiv that there can be no objection to this view on the part of Latin Christians, but he does so by redefining *principaliter* when it is used of God:

Quod si dicitur quia spiritus sanctus principaliter est de patre, quasi magis sit de patre quam in filio, non ita dicendum est, ut intelligatur ulla praedictarum varietatum inesse⁸⁴).

«If it is said that the Holy Spirit exists principally of the Father' — as Augustine says in one of his sermons⁸⁵) — 'as if he existed more from the Father than from the Son, it must not be said in such a way as to imply that there is any of the variety we have discussed in this'. The 'variety' Anselm has been considering is the diversity which is present in things which can be more or less, earlier or later, greater or lesser than one another. Since the Son is everything that the Father is,

⁸¹) S 2.177.4.

⁸²) S 2.211-2, Chapter 13.

⁸³) PL 188.1204-5.

⁸⁴) S 2.213.3-5.

⁸⁵) PL 38.459.

no inferiority is imputed to him when we say that the Holy Spirit proceeds principally from the Father⁸⁶). This is in no way as it would be in created things: *in rebus creatis*⁸⁷), where what is not first is second, in rank as well as in order. St. Anselm has, in other words, explored a philosophical and theological issue as he refines his definition, where Anselm of Havelberg has been content to marshal his authorities. Even where he argues his reasoned case earlier in the second Book of the *Dialogus* he has felt it adequate to put forward technically sound but generally brief and conventional arguments. Anselm of Havelberg, despite his enthusiasm for novel applications of historical theology, has not been inspired to original thought by the problem he has tried to resolve in his second Book.

He is evidently pleased with his treatise. He feels that he has made his point and convinced Nechites; as a missionary exercise the debate has been a success. As a book to be read by Latin Christians the work has the novelty of including material taken directly from the Greeks, both living and dead protagonists for the Eastern Church's view. It is also a thoroughly workmanlike rendering of the main points of debate which were current in the schools of the West, including as it does topical items and various technical devices drawn from the *artes*. It is the complete handbook to the *filioque* controversy, up to date and conceived and executed on a grand scale, with additional material on differences of usage in the sacraments and other matters where Greeks disagreed with Latins. Anselm of Canterbury's work is narrower, but it has gone deeper. Although he has looked at issues which were still topical in Anselm of Havelberg's day he has not supplied what the next generation demanded by way of brief, technically informed discussion. The Bishop of Havelberg's work owes little or nothing to his, it appears, because he speaks on behalf of another generation of theologians. In its own day, his *Dialogus* had a considerable stature precisely because it was a product of its time.

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⁸⁶) S 2.213.12-3.

⁸⁷) S 2.213.30.